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I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, nations have regulated
communications industries to varying degrees in
pursuit of policy goals that are deemed unachievable without government intervention. Traditionally, government intervention has occurred in an
environment that permitted-or, some might argue, necessitated-the development of regulatory
frameworks that relied on monopoly providers
and imposed rules that differed substantially with
the type of communications technology. In recent
years, circumstances have changed dramatically.
Policymakers are actively seeking to encourage
competition and implement deregulatory policies
in many industries of traditionally heavily-regulated monopoly providers. Furthermore, what
have traditionally been economically distinct communications markets are converging into a common market because of advancements in communications technology. These developments are increasing the complexity of developing, evaluating
and implementing appropriate government interventions in communications markets. The consequence of these developments are thus three-fold:
the risks of adverse unintended consequences of
government interventions rise; the costs caused by
such consequences increase; and the ability to implement timely corrections is constrained.
This article asserts that "essentiality of access"that is, the historical alignment of access (to an
essential service or facility) problems to legal principles-should be used as an organizing principle

for examining many of the future policy objectives in the communications industry in order to
better enable the adoption of appropriate government interventions. Policy problems that have
consistently been handled by distinct legal rules
for each distinct technology, must now be addressed simultaneously across competing technology platforms. In this article, "essentiality of access" is applied to debates regarding broadband
policy in the United States, as broadband access
issues entail legal complexities that serve as a useful microcosm of this convergence of legal paradigms in the communications industry.
Using "essentiality of access" as a focal point,
this article demonstrates that differing types of access objectives based on viewing broadband as an
essential service or facility require reference to
distinctive legal principles. By juxtaposing differing access problems and legal principles, this paper explains how the pursuit of broadband policy
objectives will require recognition of the differing
relationships of access recipients to the access
providers-as end user customer, competitor,
speaker or audience member-that at times conflict and require policymakers to choose certain
interests over others. This legal reality makes the
selection of broadband policy objectives and associated government interventions a tremendously
complex endeavor.
In making broadband policy decisions, however, this article shows that there is an even more
fundamental challenge for policymakers and the
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courts. When balancing the competing interests
of access recipients and access providers, the constitutionality of broadband policy choices may depend on characteristics of broadband providers
that are unique to the corporate form. The legal
rights and duties of individuals and corporations
are not synonymous under United States law, although the distinction is perhaps less obvious in
recent times given the prevalence of the corporate form throughout the twentieth century. The
courts will ultimately need to clarify the principles
for determining the rights of broadband corporations under the United States Constitution in order to address the constitutional challenges that
new broadband policies will likely engender.
Section II of this article describes how "essentiality of access" can be used as an organizing
principle. Section III briefly describes the diversity
of perceived benefitg from widespread broadband
deployment, and the breadth of the corresponding demands for government intervention. Section III also stresses the complexity of developing
broadband policy because of obvious legal, economic and political constraints on government action. Section IV identifies the important legal
principles that evolved in the United States in response to various types of access problems regarding an essential service or facility. The historical
development and meaning of each legal principle
is provided, with the discussion organized according to the type of affected rights-economic, welfare or free speech. Section V identifies broadbaild access issues in terms of the type of access
problem posed and the legal rights affected. Assuming that the relevant aspect of broadband access is an essential service or facility, and the circumstances require government intervention, it
then identifies the associated legal principles discussed in Section IV, and describes how differing
principles and rights may be in conflict. Section
VI discusses why the pursuit of broadband policy
objectives will require policy makers and the

I The legal principles include common carrier and public utility obligations, "business affected with a public interest," the essential facilities doctrine, universal service and free
speech rights. See infra Section IV and Table 1.
2 It is important to use the historically developed legal
principles for several reasons. First, many of the broadband
access issues stem from long-recognized economic or societal
problems that the legal system has had to address in other
contexts and for which specific legal principles have already
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courts to explicitly consider and clarify the differing rights of natural persons and corporations.
II.

"ESSENTIALITY OF ACCESS" AS AN
ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE

In the United States, there are various contexts
in which concerns of access to some essential service or facility have arisen and for which legal
principles have been developed. As discussed in
Section III, problems of access to an essential service or facility differ based on the following set of
characteristics: what services or facilities are
deemed to be essential; for whom (access recipient) they are deemed to be essential; the nature
of the relationship between the access recipient
and the access provider; and what circumstances
are impeding the accessibility of the service or facility. Furthermore, specific legal principles' have
developed, both under the common law and in
statutes, to address access issues bearing similar
characteristics.
The mapping of access situations sharing similar characteristics next to the legal principles applied to them can be a valuable tool for determining the appropriate course of government intervention for future "access to essential service or
2
facilities" problems.
Using an access problem-to-legal principle typology for purposes of evaluating broadband access issues is what is meant in this article by applying "essentiality of access" as an organizing principle. More specifically, each broadband access objective is first analyzed in terms of the specific form of
access deemed to be essential-to whom, from whom,
and for what purpose-and the underlying problems
or obstacles impeding that access. Next, existing legal
principles addressing previous access problems
with similar characteristics are identified and evaluated for their suitability to address the broadband access issue.
In terms of determining whether government
intervention is necessary, it is important to recogbeen established. Second, awareness of these preexisting
principles is not only insightful of prior experience but is
often necessary to address legal constraints on transitioning
from preexisting regimes. Third, trends underlying the development of existing legal principles reveal a more fundamental legal problem unresolved by the courts-the scope of
corporations' constitutional rights-that will affect judicial
enforcement of agency or legislative interventions to achieve
broadband objectives.
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nize that different legal principles affect different
types of legal rights. In particular, the legal principles that are relevant here affect economic rights,
welfare-related rights or free speech rights. Awareness of the types of rights that are affected-both
rights of the access recipient and of the access
provider-is necessary for determining whether
there may be conflicts of different rights when simultaneously pursuing multiple access objectives,
as well as the options available for resolving them.
For example, some rights may have greater constitutional protections than others, thereby limiting
legislative prerogative for choosing among constituent interests. In this regard, the distinction in
constitutional rights of individuals, as opposed to
corporations, may be critical.
III.

THE COMPLEXITY OF BROADBAND
POLICY

Recent policy debates affecting the communications industry have focused on encouraging the
widespread deployment of broadband technology. In this context, broadband refers to a technical "capability that enables users to originate and
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technology." 3 The perceived benefits of broadband deployment are vast and diverse, as noted by Federal
Communication Commission Chairman Michael
Powell:
The widespread deployment of broadband infrastructure has become the central communications policy objective today. It is widely believed that ubiquitous broad" Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §157(c)
(2001). See also FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, Remarks at
the National Summit on Broadband Deployment, Washington D.C. (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov.
4 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission,
Digital Broadband Migration Part 1I, at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Powell/200l /spmkpl 09.html (Oct. 23, 2001).
5
See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHITE PAPER, No
COMPETITION: How MONOPOLY CONTROL OF THE BROADBAND

INTERNET THRFATENS FREE SPEECH, at http://www.aclu.org/

issues/cyber/broadband-report.pdf (2002) (the ACLU report is supported by a study that it commissioned, jointly with
the Center of Digital Democracy, to Columbia Telecommunications Corporation regarding the technical prospects for
maintaining the Internet's open nature as it makes the shift
from dial-up to cable).
6

See generally STEPHEN

TUTE, PUTTING

BROADBAND

POCIASK, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTION HIGH SPEED: NEW PUBLIC POLI-

CIES TO ENCOURAGE RAPID DEPLOYMENT

(2002).

See 47 U.S.C. §254(h) (1) (B) (2001) (requiring that certain educational institutions be given discounts, which are
often referred to as the "e-rate," for the purchase of telecom7

band deployment will bring valuable new services to
consumers, stimulate economic activity, improve national productivity, and advance many other worthy
objectives-such as improving education, and advancing economic opportunity for more Americans. We
share much of this view and intend to do our
part in
4
advancing reasonable and timely deployment.

Reports, studies and proposed legislation related to broadband also reflect this diversity in alleged benefits and, consequently, call for varying
and distinctly different forms of government intervention. For example, the ACLU advocates that
regulators mandate open access of cable systems
to Internet Service Providers ("ISP"s) because Internet access makes available to citizens a form of
speech and self-expression that is perhaps the
closest thing ever invented to a true free market
of ideas. 5 The Economic Policy Institute proposes
adopting a model of symmetric intermodal regulation for digital subscriber line ("DSL") services
and cable modem services to foster private sector
investment in broadband infrastructure. They argue that this would allow private investors to reap
the benefits of improved business productivity,
greater consumer prosperity and economic
growth. 6 The Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights Education Fund and the Benton Foundation urge the federal government to continue
funding for the e-rate, 7 the Technology Opportunities Program" and the Community Technology
Centers Program, 9 in order to narrow gaps in access to computers and the Internet. These gaps
generally arise from a digital divide based on income, race and ethnicity, geography and disability."' Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) plans to
munications services, funded through contributions assessed
against telecommunications service providers). See also 47
C.F.R. §§54.400-520 (2001) (implementing universal service
funding for schools and libraries pursuant to §254).
8 See Bringing a Nation Online, infra note 10, at 13-16 (explaining that the Technology Opportunities Program was initiated in 1994 by the United States Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration to provide matching grants to nonprofit organizations in order to promote widespread availability and use
of digital network technologies in the public and non-profit
sectors).
9 Id. at 16-17 (noting that the Community Technology
Centers Program was established in 1999 by the Department
of Education to "promote the development of model programs that demonstrate the educational effectiveness of technology in urban and rural areas and economically distress
communities").
10 See Press Release, Civil Rights.org, New Report Concludes Federal Programs Critical to Bringing Nation Online,
at http://www.civilrights.org/issues/commtinication/details.
cfm?id=9456 (July 11, 2002) (the report was written by Leslie

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

introduce a series of legislative initiatives, including an FCC regulatory plan, tax incentives, government support for research on advanced infrastructure technology and government use of ecommerce broadband applications in an effort to
achieve major economic growth and productivity
gains in the United States by making affordable
broadband Internet connections available to
American homes, schools and small businesses. I
As these examples illustrate, the type of government intervention deemed likely to encourage
the deployment of broadband technology depends on the perception of the desired benefits to
be reaped, as well as the remedies necessary to
overcome the obstacles in achieving them. Thus,
simply stating that one supports government intervention to encourage widespread deployment
of broadband infrastructure is hopelessly vague.
Rather, development of broadband policy requires a clear articulation of the purposes for
which government intervention is being sought,
and an assessment of how that intervention
should be designed to accomplish those goals.
The complexity of developing broadband policy is further complicated by the difficulties in
transitioning from preexisting regulatory regimes
that vary with historically distinct communications
technologies. Some changes in government policy
may pose legal or economic-not to mention political-problems that undermine the sustainability of achieving the desired policy objectives over time. Failure to adequately anticipate
and address these problems, as extensively discussed by the author in prior work,' 2 will likely in-

crease the risk of adverse, unintended consequences brought about by government action or
Harris & Associates for the Digital Media Forum, a project of
the Ford Foundation) [hereinafter Bringinga Nation Online].
II Memorandum from the Office of Senator Joseph I.

Lieberman, Broadband: A 21st Century Technology and Productivity Strategy, at http://www.senate.gov/-lieberman/
press/02/050broadband.pdf (May 28, 2002).
12
See generally Barbara A. Cherry, Filling the Political Feasibility and Economic Viability Cap to Achieve Sustainable Telecommunications Policies (presented at the Sixth Asia Pacific Re-

gional Conference of the International Telecommunications
Society, Kowloon, Hong Kong), at http://www.its200l.ust.
hk/program.html (July 7, 2001) (providing a framework to
satisfy both political feasibility and economic viability constraints in designing policies affecting a nation's telecommunications infrastructure); Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S.
Wildman, Preventing Flawed Communication Policies by Addressing Constitutional Principles, 2000 L. REV. Mmiir. ST. U. DET.

C.L. 55 (2002) (providing a framework for addressing the
constitutional and economic problems that limit options for
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inaction. It could also hinder the ability to implement timely corrections.
IV. LEGAL PRINCIPLES MANDATING
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES OR
FACILITIES
This section first provides an overview of significant legal principles that have developed in response to different problems regarding access to
some essential service or facility. Subsection A reviews the underlying sources of governmental
power on which these legal principles are based.
Subsections B through D review the meaning of
these legal principles and the historical reasons
underlying their development. The discussions in
Subsections B through D are organized to address
legal principles affecting economic rights, welfare
rights and free speech rights, respectively. The
background provided throughout this section is
necessary for evaluating the application of legal
principles to broadband access problems in Section V, and for understanding the need to consider and clarify the differing constitutional rights
of individuals and corporations in Section VI.
The following table (Table 1) provides an overview of important legal principles that have developed in the United States to address various access problems with regard to an essential service
or facility. The table first describes the access
problem-for what reason access is deemed necessary, the relationship of the access recipient to
the access provider, and the nature of the underlying problem or purpose to be addressed-and
then the legal principle and associated obligations
of the access provider that developed to address
modifying communication policies in response to new technologies and deregulatory philosophy) [hereinafter Cherry
& Wildman 2(00]; Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S. Wildman,
InstitutionalEndowment as Foundationfor Regulatory Performance
and Regime Transitions: The Role of the US Constitution in Telecommunications Regulation in the United States, 23 TELECOMMUat http://www.tpeditor.
NICAIONS POLICY 607-23 (1999),

com/tponline.htm (Oct. 1999) (analyzing the relationship of
constitutional principles to economic efficiency goals, with
application to recovery of stranded costs) [hereinafter
Cherry & Wildman 1999]; Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S.
Wildman, Unilateraland Bilateral Rales: A Framework for Increasing Competition While Meeting Universal Service Goals in Telecom-

munications, in

MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENIIANCEVALUNFION

ING. TIHE PROCESS THROUGH.MULTIDISCIPLINARY

(Barbara A. Cherry, Steven S. Wildman, & A. Hammond,
eds., 1999) (1999) [hereinafter Unilateral and Bilateral Rules]
(analyzing legal and economic problems of pursuing universal service goals in a market without legal monopolies).
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Table 1: Legal Principles to Address Different Access Problems
Regarding Essential Services or Facilities
Access is Needed
to Sustain What

Relationship of
Access Recipient to
Access Provider

Underlying Purpose
or Problem

Legal Principle(s)

Obligations of
Access Provider

Provision of essential
service, not adequately
supplied in a competitive market, throughout the community.

Customer as endusers.

Economic coercion;
dependence of customer requires protection.

Common carrier; public utility; business
affected with a public
interest,

Provide access to
essential service without discrimination, at
reasonable rates, and
with adequate skill
and care.

Viable competition in
a related market of a
monopolist,

Competitors.

Economic characteristics of supply require
access to monopolist's
essential facilities.

Prohibit refusal to
deal with competitors
(e.g. essential facilities
doctrine),

Provide access to
essential facility
(input) under reasonable prices, terms and
conditions.

Equality of access to
essential services.

Targeted customers as
endusers.

High cost of providing
service; indigence of
customers,

Universal service as a
form of welfare benefit.

Contribute funds to
and/or provide subsidized essential services.

Legitimacy of, and citizen's participation in,
democracy.

Speaker as enduser or
competitor (for benefit of audience).

Viewpoint diversity
and channel provider's potential
refusal to deal with
speaker.

Free speech rights.

Provide access to
channel of communication.

that problem. The first two rows of Table 1 describe legal principles related to economic rights,
the third row to welfare-related rights and the last
row to free speech rights.1"
A.

Sources of Governmental Powers

The Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution14 clearly establishes that powers not
granted to the federal government are reserved to
the states.15 So while the federal government has
the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, the states retain the power to regulate intrastate commerce.' 6 In addition, state powers include inherent powers of the sovereign that have
their origin under English common law. 17 These
inherent powers include police power, franchising and the creation of corporations.' 8 The legal
13 The classification of rights is apparent from the content of the second and third columns.
14
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
15 The Tenth Amendment provides: "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16 Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce among the States. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.

principles in Table 1 can be traced, in large part,
to the exercise of these powers.
The police power is the power to legislate for
the common welfare.1 The police power is the
basis of broad regulatory authority that state legislatures have exercised to implement a wide array
of policy objectives, such as those affecting economic, welfare, and free speech rights as discussed in Sections B through D. However, a
State's exercise of the police power is limited by
the provisions of the United States Constitution,
enforceable upon judicial review by the courts. As
discussed in Subsection B.4, judicial interpretation of the permissible scope of a State's police
power has played an important role in shaping
the economic regulation of "essential services" in
the United States.
State governments also have the inherent au17
Each state also has its own constitution that allocates
power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches,
and may place limitations on the state legislature's inherent
powers. However, state constitutional limitations are not explored in this article.

18

See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.

19

LEONARD W.

LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH

AND CIIEFJUSTICE SHAW,

229-265 (1957) (discussing the his-

tory of the police power and its development in the United
States) [hereinafter LEVY].
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thority to delegate certain powers to private individuals for the purpose of benefiting the public.
Such a delegation of power is referred to as the
granting of a franchise.2~1 As discussed in Subsection B.1, the franchise power has been used extensively in the United States to enable the widespread deployment of infrastructures by private
entities, such as railroads and public utilities that
are deemed to be essential.
State governments also have the power to create corporations.2 1 Based on the traditional meaning of this power under English common law, a
corporation was considered a quasi-governmental
body-that is, a private government holding delegated public authority-that was self-governing
and could hold property.22 A special legislative act
was required to grant a charter for a corporation,
and the corporation's activities were limited to
what was specified in the charter. By the seventeenth century, some corporations charters were
granted to establish enterprises created to make
profits for its stockholders.23 However, it was not
until the nineteenth century that general incorporation statutes were gradually enacted by the
states to eliminate the need for special legislative
acts to grant charters and to permit private persons to create corporations.2 4 As described in Subsections B.2 and B.3, these general incorporation
statutes gave rise to economic abuses that the Interstate Commerce Act 2 5 and the Sherman Anti-

trust Act 2 ' were enacted to address.

20
Franchises were required to permit private individuals
to charge tolls or fees for the use of facilities they built, such
as bridges, ferries, aqueducts, and canals. Franchises could
also be used to delegate to private parties the governmental
authority-such as eminent domain-that was necessary to
exercise their functions uinder the franchise.]. HUGHFS, THE
GOVERNMENT HABrr REDUX 37-43, 103-05 (1991) (discussing
franchising powers). See generally Sallyanne Payton, The Duty
oJ a Public Utility to Serve in the Presence of New Competition, in
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIc PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC UTrILrrY IN-

121-52 (Werner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies eds.,
1981) (discussing the historical derivations of the delegation
of power to private individuals and how this special service
obligation is currently bestowed on common carriers and
public utility companies) [hereinafter Payton].
21
See Andrew L. Creighton, The Emergence of Incorporation as a Legal Form for Organization (1990) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with this auDUSTRIES

thor) (discussing the development of the corporation) [hereinafter Creighton]; Payton, supra note 20 at 135-36 (discuss-

ing the development of the corporation).
22
See Creighton, supra note 21, at 34-39. See generally
JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORA-

B.

Access Issues Affecting Economic Rights

The legal principles affecting economic rights
in Table 1 address evolving concepts of economic
coercion for which government intervention has
been deemed necessary for the purpose of providing access to an essential service or facility. The
legal principles that relate to economic coercion
of customers (as end users) are based on: the law
of common carriers and public utilities; the codification of common carrier regulation .of railroads

in the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") of 1887;
and the state's power to regulate "businesses affected with a public interest." The legal principles
related to economic coercion affecting competitors is the essential facilities doctrine, a doctrine
that has evolved from judicial interpretation of
the Sherman Act in 1890 and related cases addressing refusals to deal.2 7 Furthermore, a common thread running throughout the evolution of

these legal principles is the changing form and
growing importance of corporations.
B. 1.

Common Carrierand Public Utility Regulation

Common carriers and public utilities are subject to a greater degree of regulation than general
businesses. Furthermore, as a subset of "businesses affected with a public interest," as discussed
in Subsection B.4, greater regulatory burdens are
permissible under the United States Constitution.
Under current law, telecommunications service
providers281 are both considered both common
IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970, 13-57
(1970) (discussing the historical framework that led to the
growth of corporations as quasi-governmental bodies) [here-

TION

inafter

HURST].

"234See Creighton, supra note 21, at 34-39;
note 22, at 16-19.
24 See Creighton, supra note 21, at 51-54;
note 22, at 13-18.

HURST,

supra

HURST,

supra

25
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§10101-11917 (1993))
(repealed in large part by the ICC Termination Act of 1995,
Pub. L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 805, 49 U.S.C. §10101 etseq. (1997)).
26
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)

(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (2000)).
27
See infra notes 51.
28 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §151
(2001) (defining "Telecommunications carrier" as "any provider of telecommunications services"); 47 U.S.C. §153(44)
(2001). "Telecommunications service" is defined as "the of-

fering of telecommunications for
or to 'such classes of users as to be
to the public, regardless of the
§153(46). "Telecommtnications"

a fee directly to the public,
effectively available directly
facilities used." 47 U.S.C.
is defined as "the transmis-
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carriers and public utilities. 29 Thus, if providing

an affirmative duty to render service demanded

broadband access is one in the same as providing
telecommunications services, then the legal obligations imposed on common carriers and public
30
utilities become involved.
Unique obligations have been imposed on common carriers since the Middle Ages and are based
on the English common law of "public callings.""'
These obligations evolved in medieval England to
address numerous situations of economic coercion, exploitation and the illegal wielding of bargaining power. These obligations are: to charge
reasonable prices ('just price");32 to serve without
discrimination; and to exercise their calling with
33
adequate care, skill and honesty.
The same obligations were subsequently applied to a new category of entities, public utilities,3 4 which developed during the nineteenth
century in the United States. A public utility is a
private corporation that provides a service of public importance, or necessity, under a government

by any member of the public.3 5 Public utilities

grant of privilege. This grant of privilege imposes
sion, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received." 47 U.S.C.
§153(43).
29
See

BARBARA A.

CHERRY, THE CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICA-

50-57 (1999) [hereinafter CHERRY].
30 Whether the provision of broadband access should be
considered the provision of a telecommunications service is
highly debatable. See infra Section V (discussing some of the
TIONS CARRIER LIABILITY

ramifications of the inclusion or exclusion of broadband access from the definition of telecommunications service).
31
Public callings originated with passage of the Statute
of Laborers in 1349 to prevent workers from extracting unreasonable wages due to large population loss from the Black
Death. Over time, any service performed for the public
outside of the feudalistic relationship of lord-to-man was considered a public calling. Examples include common carriers,
innkeepers, blacksmiths and surgeons. With the decline of
feudalism, most businesses came to be governed by the evolving common law of contracts. However, the tort obligations
of public callings remained for a few classes of businesses,
including common carriers. Notwithstanding the declining
scope of businesses to which the obligations of public callings
still applied, they were also imposed on a new class of businesses-public utilities-that evolved during the nineteenth century. See MARTIN G. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN
CAPITALISM 197-99 (1957) (discussing the development of
public callings) [hereinafter GLAESER]; see generally Edward A.
Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REv. 135 (1915)
(discussing the development of public callings).
32 A significant component of the obligations of public
callings is the doctrine of the 'lust price." Originating in medieval England, the just price doctrine required equivalence
of value in exchange so that the price of a good or service
reflects its value for the community in general, and is not
excessively high or low due to unique circumstances of specific buyers or sellers. Its purpose was to enforce justice in

were initially created by local government grants
of franchises, which were subsequently preempted
by the codification of public utility law in state
statutes. 36 It should be noted, however, that a public utility's obligations tend to be greater than
those of a common carrier because a public utility
typically bears the affirmative duty to extend facilities to serve an entire community, and is also constrained in its ability to discontinue the provision
37
of service.
B.2. Interstate Regulation of Common Carriers
As previously discussed, throughout the nineteenth century, the states enacted general incorporation statutes. The ease with which corporations could then be created provided the means
to accumulate vast levels of capital for industrial
enterprises and to conduct interstate business on
an unprecedented scale.38 During the latter part
economic transactions that involved coercion, exploitation
and misuse of bargaining power. John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of the Just Price, in 49 TRANSACTIONS OF TIHE AMERI(AN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 4, 68-80 (1959) (discussing just
price doctrine). See also ODD LANGHOLM, ECONOMICS IN THE
MEDIEVAL SCHOOLS 221-35 (1992) (discussing just price doctrine).
33 See CHERRY, supra note 29.
'4 See LEVY, supranote 19, at 355-65. The common law of

public utilities initially developed with the construction of
railroads, and was later applied to services resulting from
other inventions, such as the provision of telegraph service,
telephone service, electricity and gas. Id.
-35 See CHERRY, supra note 29, at 52-55; GLAESER, supra

note 31, at 216, 218-19.
:6 During the nineteenth century, states enacted statutes
to regulate railroads. An important legal innovation in these
laws was the creation of state regulatory commissions, or expert agencies, to implement and enforce the statutory
scheme. Starting in the late nineteenth century, but primarily
during the early twentieth century, states also placed telegraph and telephone companies under the jurisdiction of
state regulatory commissions-frequently the same agencies
that regulated railroads. See generally William K. Jones, Origins
of the Certificateof Public Convenience and Necessity: Developinents
in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426 (1979) (dis-

cussing the creation of state regulatory commissions);
NETH LIPARTITO, THE BELL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL

THE TELEPHONE IN THE SOUTH,

KEN-

BUSINESS:

1877-1920, 175-207 (1989)

(discussing the creation of state regulatory commissions).
37 See LEVY, supra note 19, at 255-59. However, a few businesses are both common carriers and public utilities, such as

railroads and telecommunications companies. Id.
38 See generally HURST, supra note 22, at 13-55 (discussing
the development of the corporate form in the United States).
The rise of "big business" began in the 1880s, "that is, the
development of a new economic institution, the large enter-
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of the nineteenth century, common law remedies
did not adequately address the economic abuses
of large corporations, and corporations' interstate

activities were beyond the jurisdictional reach of
the states' police powers. 39 In response, a special
United States Senate committee, popularly known
as the Cullom Committee, was created to review
these economic abuses associated with large corporations, particularly with regard to the railroad
industry. 40 In 1886, the committee issued its report, the Cullom Report, which presents a classical statement of need for federal economic regu41
lation of the railroad.
The Cullom Report stated, in pertinent part:
[N]o general question of governmental policy occupies
at this time so prominent a place in the thoughts of the
people as that of controlling the steady growth and extending influence of corporate power and of regulating
its relations to the public; and as no corporations are
more conspicuously before the public eye, and as there
are none whose operations so directly affect every citizen in the daily pursuit of his business or avocation as
the corporations engaged in transportation, they naturally receive the most consideration in this connection.42

In recognition of the railroad's importance to
commerce in the United States, and its historical
grant of privileges to perform a public function,
the Cullom Report highlighted the unique relationship that railroads have to the public, as
they-when compared to general businessesbear greater obligations. To address the economic abuses in the railroad industry-particularly discrimination in rates among customers,
speculative building and irresponsible financial
manipulation-it recommended a Federal statuprise, that commercialized, produced, and marketed goods
on an unprecedented scale for national and international
markets." Alfred D. Chandler, The Information Age in Historical
Perspective, IN A NAION TRANSFORMED By INFORMATION 15
(Alfred D. Chandler & James W. Cortada, eds., 2000). The
railroad and telegraph brought into being a new institution
that "consisted of a managerial, integrated corporate enterprise that transformed existing industries while creating new
ones, during what historians have termed the Second Industrial Revolution." Id.
9
See generally Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (holding the state statute regllating railroad transportation unconstitutional, because such
transportation was interstate commerce and within the sole
control and regulation of Congress tinder the federal constitution).
40 See I Ti-iE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDuSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HisroRy OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES
31 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1973) [hereinafter Schwartz].
41 See generally id. at 16-87 (discussing the origins of the
Interstate Commerce Act and extracts from the Cullom Re-

[Vol. 11

tory scheme of regulation. 4 "The next year, the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") 4 4 was enacted
based on the Cullom Report, creating the first
federal expert agency to implement an interstate
regulatory statute.

B.3.

45

Sherman Act and Refusals to Deal

As stated in the Cullom Report, the economic
abuses of large corporations were not confined to
railroads. However, it was easier politically to first
enact a federal statute regulating only the railroad
industry. 46 The ICA was soon followed by enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. 4 7 The

Sherman Act was the first federal antitrust statute
prohibiting certain anticompetitive and monopo48
listic practices by all general businesses.

The Sherman Act was enacted to regulate a
broader concept of economic coercion, which
had been developing under neoclassical economics. This new concept was broader than what had
been recognized under the common law. For example, neoclassical economists expanded the concept of economic coercion "to encompass the collective refusal to deal, and .

.

. the loss of market

opportunities that competition would have afforded."

49

Although the economic abuses underlying passage of the Sherman Act were primarily in response to concerns for consumers as end users,
plaintiffs have also pursued claims in their role as
competitors. 511 More specifically, cases had been

brought involving collective, or unilateral refusals
to deal with competitors. 5 '

Assertion of such

port).

Id. at 33.
Id. at 31-87.
44
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§10101-11917 (1993)).
45
See GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 5-7, 31-58 (1982). The enactment of the ICA is part
of a larger legal trend towards statttorification that started in
42

43

the nineteenth century to address the inadequacies of com-

mon law remedies. Id.
461 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 31 (stating that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Wabash v. Illinois,
was also a significant catalyst for the passage of the ICA).
47 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
48

LAW

1 PHILLHP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST

§§101-03

(2d

ed.

2000)

[hereinafter

AREEDA

&

HOVENKAMP VOL. I].

4
5"0
5I

i. at §§ 104a-b.
Id.
For cases involving unilateral refusals to deal, see, e.g.,
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claims prior to the Sherman Act were uncommon,
as tort common law imposed liability for refusals
to deal only on "businesses affected with a public
interest," which included common carriers and
public utilities. 52 Over time, however, the courts
have interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit refusals to deal for a broader set of businesses and
circumstances. 53 This trend has also led to the de54
velopment of the essential facilities doctrine.
The primary use of this doctrine is to require a
monopolist to share with competitors at a reasonable price, an input that is deemed essential for
viable competition in a related market. 55 A commonality these refusal to deal cases is the availability of a legal remedy requiring access by a competitor to some service or facility deemed essential
for viable competition.

United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (holding that
the defendant violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and enjoining the dominant owner of movie theaters (defendant)
from interfering in the contract terms between movie producers and competing theaters in other towns); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (holding that
the defendant was subject to antitrust regulation and ordering the defendant-monopolist of electric transmission lines
to wheel power to municipalities that operated their own retail distribution facilities). For cases involving collective refusals to deal, see, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St.
Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (holding that defendant was engaged in illegal restraint and an attempted monopoly, and
therefore the court required members of the railroad association to admit their railroad competitors to their consortium
to enable access to the only existing railway bridge); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding defendant in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and requiring
the Associated Press to admit non-member newspapers on
terms that did not discriminate against newspapers that competed with existing AP members). For a discussion of cases
regarding refusals to deal, see generally 3A PHILLIP AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw §770-72 (2d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP VOL. 3A].
52 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP VOL. 3A, supra note 51, at

§§7 70c and 770d.
53
54

See supra note 51.
AREEDA & HOVENCAMP VOL. 3A, supra note 51, at §771c

(explaining that although the United States Supreme Court
has provided remedies for refusals to deal in some cases,
what has come to be known as the essential facilities doctrine
was developed in lower federal courts and has not been accepted by the United States Supreme Court). Furthermore,
having evolved as a result of some courts' interpretation of
the Sherman Act, the essential facilities doctrine is considered common law in some federal courts' jurisdictions. 2
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw
§302 (rev. ed. 1995).
PHILLIP AREEDA

55

MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.

B. 4.

"Businesses Affected With A Public Interest"

An important function of the courts is to determine when government regulation exceeds constitutional limits. In the nineteenth century, important cases were decided to delineate the permissible scope of State regulation under the
United States Constitution. 56 Of particular importance here is the concept of "businesses affected with
a public interest," which developed under the English common law, and is recognized by the
57
United States Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois.
Under this concept, the permissible scope of State
regulation under its police power is greater for
businesses affected with a public interest than for
general businesses. 58 Businesses affected with a
public interest are those for which it was deemed
that the dependence of the customer required
protection; and those businesses included common carriers and public utilities. 59 Key attributes
of these businesses 6° are: (1) that the service is of
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 891 (1983). Liability under the essential facilities doctrine is based on the following criteria: "(1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3)
the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4)
the feasibility of providing the facility." Id.
56 See generally LEVY, supra note 19, at 229-81 (discussing
the development of case law during the nineteenth century

that delineated constitutional limitations on states' exercise
of their police powers).
57 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
58
See id. at 126, 130-32.
59 See generally GLAESER, supra note 31, at 202, 206-19.
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a

public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such
are the railroads, other common carriers and public utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the
public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by
Parliament or Colonial legislatures for regulating all
trades and callings. Such are those of the keepers of
inns, cabs, and grist mills.
(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have
become subject in consequence to some government
regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon them.
Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923).
See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 532 (1934) (noting
that in Munn v. Illinois, the Court found that a grain elevator
fell under the third category because the "elevator was strategically situated and that a large portion of the public found it
highly inconvenient to deal with others.").
60 GLAESER, supra note 31, at 206-19. Significantly, the
second attribute includes numerous situations in which corn-
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special public importance or necessity; (2) that
circumstances or characteristics of supply are such
that the service is not available in a competitive
market; and (3) that the activity has current and/
or future widespread effects on the community at
large. 61
In Nebbia v. New York,1 2 the Supreme Court effectively broadened the scope of permissible regulation under the police power for any business, so
that the need to prove that a business did or did
not fall into the historical classes of businesses af3
fected with a public interest fell into disuse."
However, the traditional definition of businesses
affected with a public interest is not irrelevant.
This is because, even though the Court found that
the police power was coextensive with regulation
in the public interest, it still maintained that permissible regulation as to a given business depends
4
on the specific circumstances in each case."1
Nebbia v. New York is significant in that the court
held that even though a wider range of businesses
can now be subject to some government regulation, what is deemed a reasonable assertion of
that governmental authority is still likely to be
greater for a business in which the circumstances
are similar to those of traditional justifications for
regulating "businesses affected with a public interest."
C. Access Issues Affecting Welfare Rights
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Table 1 represent government efforts to institutionalize some minimum level of rights in terms
of access to essential goods and services. Under
English law, this concept originated with the passage of the Elizabethan Poor Laws in the sixteenth
century to address beggary and civil disorder
caused by famine.65 Under these statutes, a poor

tax was imposed to finance the care of paupers.""
In the United States, early forms of governmentally funded relief for "needy" groups of individuals began with pension benefits for Civil War veterans in the nineteenth century and mothers'
pensions in the early twentieth century."7 The
modern relief system in the United States developed during two periods of social policy innovation. This first period of innovation was the New
Deal of the 1930s. The second era of change was
during the Great Society, which was largely in response to the Civil Rights movement and the
Nixon era reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s.11a
During the first period, innovations included the
establishment of old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, and relief programs for the aged,
the blind and the orphaned in the Social Security
Act of 1935."i' During the second period, the federal government intervened to break down state
barriers that had evolved to impede eligibility for
the relief programs. 7" All of the welfare-related

programs are intended to provide needy individuals-whether old, unemployed, poor, or disabled-with the financial means to meet basic

The legal principles affecting welfare rights in

arise from the grant of some special governmental privilege,

ble exertion of governmental atthority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory." Id.

even a legal monopoly, such as to common carriers or public
utilities. However it also includes situations that arise without

114
Id. at 531, 536-38. The Court proceeded to examine
the specific circumstances of the case-concerning the consti-

government involvement, such as firms being strategically sit-

tutionality of price regulation of retail milk sales in New York-

uated in terms of location (grain elevators) or time (innkeep-

in a manner reflective of the traditional attributes of businesses affected with a public interest. The Court found that,

petition is considered impracticable. Such situations might

Munn, 94 U.S. at 126,
ers with respect to travelers). See, e.g.,
131-32.
61 GLAESER,supra note 31, at 206-19.Significantly, the second attribute includes numerous situations in which compe-

even though the dairy industry was clearly not a public utility

(having not received any public grant or franchise) nor a mo-

tition is considered impracticable. Such situations might

nopoly, the importance of the product, maladjustments of
the market, and widespread impact on the community-con-

arise from the grant of some special governmental privilege,
even a legal monopoly, such as to common carriers or public
utilities. However it also includes situations that arise without

clusions of state legislative investigation-were compelling reasons for upholding the state statute. Id.
65
See FRANCIS Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGU-

government involvement, such as firms being strategically sit-
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uated in terms of location (grain elevators) or time (innkeepers with respect to travelers). See, e.g., Munn, 94 U.S. at 126,

(1993)

131-32.
62
6-3

6,
67

291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id. at 536. "It is clear that there is no closed class or

category of businesses affected with a public interest, and the

function of courts in the application of'the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasona-

THE

8-22

[hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD].
I.
TIIEDA SKOCPOL, PROEGI'ING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:

POLITIC.AL ORIGINS

OF SOCIAL POLICY IN

TIlE UNITED

STATES 7-11 (1996).
'8 See THE POLIrICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNrrED
STATi.S 5-9 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
i9 See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at
70 /d. at 248.

248-84.
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human needs, such as food, housing, transportation and health care.
However, government has also intervened to
ensure access by all citizens-rather than just
targeting low income groups-to other essential
services, such as education. 7 1 Modern universal
service policy 7 2 with regard to telecommunica-

tions services has characteristics of both. It requires nondiscriminatory, reasonable rates for all
customers, as well as funding mechanisms to subsidize access for targeted groups. As previously discussed, the requirements of nondiscrimination
and just and reasonable rates for all customers are
based on common carrier and public utility laws.
Subsidy mechanisms for targeted groups began
with implicit subsidies in the regulated price
structure, and explicit funding mechanisms for
the benefit of certain targeted groups were recently codified by Congress in Section 254 of the
73
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
D.

Access Issues Affecting Free Speech Rights

The Free Speech Clause of the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make
74
no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech.."
The First Amendment limits actions of the federal
government; however, it has also been held applicable to the states through the Due Process
75
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Freedom of speech not only protects the interests of individuals, but it also sustains a constitu71

See Barbara A. Cherry, Crisis of Public Utility Deregulation

and the Unrecognized Welfare State, Address at the 29th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 1, 4, 12, 20, at http://arxiv.
org/ftp/cs/papers/0109/0109038.pdf (2001) (discussing
how common carrier and public utility regulation can also be

viewed as an early form of welfare state regulation in providing universalistic-rather than residualistic (means-tested)benefits) [hereinafter Cherry Telecomm Address].
72
See MARTIN L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY
4-10 (1997) (explaining universal service policy as it developed in the second half of the twentieth century as distinguished from its early meaning as interconnection policy in
the early twentieth century).
71 47 U.S.C. §254. See generally Cherry & Wildman 1999,
supra note 12 (discussing service mechanisms and policies).
See also FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, UNIVERSAL
SERVICE,
at http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/universal service/wel

com.html (providing an overview of the current universal service regime).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
76 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145-46
(quoting Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)).
The First Amendment means ... that the only constitu-

tional democracy. 7 6 The courts recognize this
dual role when addressing constitutional challenges to governmentally imposed access mandates under the freedom of speech clause of the
First Amendment. First, the courts acknowledge
that government intervention may be permissible
in order to promote free speech given the essential role that free speech plays in maintaining the
legitimacy of the government itself. In this regard,
"'it has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public."' 77 This is often referred to as the viewpoint diversity principle, 7 and its focus is on the
benefits to the public. 7 9 Second, in determining

whether a given access mandate is constitutional,
courts review the impact on the free speech rights
of the party bearing the obligation to provide access to other speakers. x0 As discussed more fully in
Section VI.D, the jurisprudence for determining
when the government's interest justifies limiting a
party's free speech rights is very complex.
. In the past, the viewpoint diversity has justified
government action mandating that owners of
channels of mass communication open access to
their facilities to certain speakers. Mandates to
provide access to certain speakers have been upheld in numerous situations such as the equal
time rules for political candidates"' and the now
repealed fairness doctrine s 2 imposed on broad-

casters; the must-carry requirements imposed on
tional way our Government can preserve itself is to leave
its people the fullest possible freedom to praise, criticize
or discuss, as they see fit, all governmental policies and
to suggest, if they desire, that even its most fundamental
postulates are bad and should be changed; 'Therein lies
the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.' Id.
77
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64
(1994) (Turner I) (quoting United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945))).
78
See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062,
1075 (1994).
79
In this context, the public's status is that of an audience.
81) See infra notes 83, 84 and 87.
81
See MICHAEL BOTEIN, REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC
MASS MEDIA 499-508 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the FCC rules
regarding political broadcasts) [hereinafter BOTEIN].
82 See id. at 469-99 (discussing the convoluted history of
the fairness doctrine).
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all
cable companies;"-" and the carry one, carry
84
rule imposed on satellite television carriers.
At this juncture, it is important to recognize the
differences in the free speech rights of electronic
mass media and telecommunications carriers. As
previously discussed in Section 1V.B.1, telecommunications carriers are considered both common carriers and public utilities and, as such, are
required to provide nondiscriminatory access to
all customers. Given the two-way (and essentially
one-on-one) interactive nature of telecommunications service, in essence, all subscribers are considered speakers.8 5 The subscribers-not the carriers-control the content of the information transmitted over the facilities. In this regard, telecommunications carriers are not speakers."! On the
other hand, electronic mass media consist primarily of one-way transmissions from a speaker to
many viewers. The owner of the channel of communication controls the content that is transmitted over the facilities, and the viewers are passive
members of an audience. Under these circumstances, providers of electronic mass media-but
not telecommunications carriers-are considered
speakers entitled to some First Amendment protection. 8 7 With the convergence of technology
platforms, the courts will have to revisit the First
Amendment distinctions in speaker status be-

tween telecommunications carriers and electronic
mass media providers.

84 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)
(Turner II) (holding as unconstitutional the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act, in which Congress required cable companies to dedicate some of their channels to local broadcast television stations to ensure that all households have access to
information and entertainment on an equal footing with
those who subscribe to cable).
84 Satellite Broad. and Communications Ass'n v. FCC,
275 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding constitutional as a content-neutral regulation, the FCC carry one carry all rule mandated by the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, in
which Congress required satellite television carriers to carry
all requesting local broadcast stations in the market where
the carrier voluntarily decides to carry one local station in
order to, in part, preserve a multiplicity of local broadcast
outlets for over-the-air-viewers who do not subscribe either to
satellite or cable service).
Significantly, both the must carry provisions on cable companies and the carry one, carry all rule on satellite television
carriers are access mandates for speakers (broadcasters) who
are also providers of competitive mass media facilities. In
this way, these access mandates have similarities to the essential facilities doctrine discussed in Section IV.B.3. On the
other hand, the cited requirements imposed on broadcasters
are access mandates for speakers who are users, but not also
competitors, of mass media facilities. In this respect, the access mandates are similar to a limited form of common car-

rier regulation.
85 In addition, for each transmission each party is usually
both a speaker to and an audience of the other party.
86 But cf Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of
California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (recognizing that public utilities are speakers with First Amendment rights with regard to
the provision of information in bill inserts mailed to customers).
But cf Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Nat'l Cable
87
Television Ass'n, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
telecommunications carriers do have free speech rights with
regard to the provision of video programming over their own
facilities). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss the complexities of the jurisprudence in this area, it is
important to recognize that courts apply different constitutional tests in dealing with the First Amendment status of
electronic media regulatory policies. A strict scrutiny test applies to "content specific" regulation. On the other hand, an
intermediate level of scrutiny test, nominally developed in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), applies to
"content neutral" regulation. In some rare cases, a minimal
scrutiny test is applied. Generally, strict scrutiny applies to
the traditional print media; intermediate scrutiny applies to
cable companies; and minimal scrutiny applies to broadcasting companies. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 42 F.3d at
190-93. See also BOTEIN, supra note 81, at 292-456 (discussing
these different constitutional standards in the electronic
mass media context).

V.

APPLYING "ESSENTIALITY OF ACCESS"
TO BROADBAND ACCESS ISSUES

This section applies "essentiality of access" as an
organizing principle for analyzing a sampling of
broadband access issues. For each issue, assume
that the relevant aspect of broadband access is
considered an essential service or facility, and the
circumstances are such that the underlying purpose or problem must be addressed through government intervention. Given this assumption, the
purposes of this section are to identify for each
broadband access issue: (1) what legal principles
should be applied based on the mapping of access
issues-to-legal principles described in Section IV
and summarized in Table 1; (2) what policy actions have taken place or are pending; and (3)
the consistencies or inconsistencies between (1)
and (2). Section VI extends the analysis in Section
V by incorporating the distinction between individuals' and corporations' constitutional rights
and the implications for addressing broadband
access issues.
The array of broadband access issues presented
here was selected so that each type of access problem-to-legal principle identified in Section IV
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would arguably be applicable to a broadband issue. In addition, the broadband access issues are
defined with reference to the layered model of
the Internet as described by Werbach. 88 The
layered model is a useful analytical tool for discussing the relationship of the technological realities of broadband to the regulatory principles applied to it."9

Table 2 provides an overview of the "essentiality
of access" analysis discussed in this section. The
broadband access issues are described in terms of
the essential service or facility for which access is
being sought and for whom. For each broadband
issue, the table then describes: the nature of the
relationship between the intended access recipient and the access provider; the nature of the underlying purpose or problem to be addressed; the
applicable legal principle from Table 1; and recent or pending policy actions.
A. Access for Individual End Users
The first broadband issue described in Table 2
is to ensure that all individual end user customers
have access to the physical layer of the broadband
network. Without access to fundamental transmission facilities, end users have no access to broadband services. For this issue, the underlying problem that may impede such access is economic coercion arising from an inequality of bargaining
power between the broadband provider of the
physical layer and the end users. This unequal
bargaining power could manifest itself in practices such as provider refusals to deal with end
users, excessively high prices, unreasonable terms

88

J.

See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1

TELECOMMS.

& HIGH

TECH.

L. 37 (2002) (originally an ad-

dress delivered at the 28th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (Aug. 17, 2000)) [hereinafter Werbach].
89 The layered model reflects the architectural design of
the Internet as an "end-to-end design and a layered protocol
stack."Id at 19. Four layers of a vertical stack are considered
relevant for regulatory purposes. They are the physical layer,
the logical layer, the applications (or service) layer and the
content layer. The physical layer is the "physical infrastructure
of the underlying networks [whatever the technology platform]: wireline (copper), cable, fiber, terrestrial wireless and
satellite." Id. at 20. The logical layer is the logical infrastructure, "which includes the management and routing functions
that keep information flowing smoothly within and across

and conditions and unreasonable discrimination
among otherwise similarly situated end users. This
is the same problem that led to the imposition of
special obligations on "businesses affected with a
public interest," particularly common carriers and
public utilities, as described in Sections IV.B.1
and B.4. Referring to Table 1, such problems have
traditionally been addressed by imposing a legal
duty on the provider of the essential service facility so that the government could provide non-discriminatory access at reasonable rates and with an
adequate standard of care. This legal principle
has its origins in the doctrine of "public callings"
from medieval England.
Recently, the FCC has adopted new policies
that would affect the likelihood of securing broadband access for all individual end users. First, in
its Cable Modem Access Order,1° the FCC defined
cable modem service as an information service
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.91
Furthermore, the FCC declared that cable
modem service is an integrated offering with no
separable telecommunications component. 9 2 As a
result, provision of cable modem service involves
the provision of no service subject to common
carrier regulation. This means that individual end
users have no common carrier access rights to the
physical layer of the cable companies' networks,
which are used for Internet access. The FCC's ruling that cable modem service is an information
service with no separable telecommunications
93
component is currently on appeal.
Recognizing that the Cable Modem decision
will pose asymmetric regulatory obligations between cable modem service providers and wire-

networks." Id. at 21. The applications layer consists of the
functions that are perhaps most familiar to end users. These
functions include, but are not limited to, "basic voice telephony,... Internet access, IP telephony, [and] video program-

ruing." Id. at 23. "The content layer involves the information
delivered to and from users as part of the applications [that
run] over communications networks." Id. at 24.
90 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter
Cable Modem Access Order].
'1
92

Id. at 4822, para. 38.
Id. at 4822-23, paras. 38-39.

93
Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, Dkt. No. 02-70518
(9th Cir. 2002).
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Table 2: Applying "Essentiality of Access" to Broadband Access Issues
Relationship of
Access Recipient
to Access Provider

Broadband
Access Issue

Underlying Purpose
or Problem

Enduser access to
physical infrastructure
of broadband network,

Individual enduser
customers,

Economic coercion
arising from inequality
of bargaining power
between provider and
customer as to an
essential service,

Physical and/or logical infrastructures of
broadband network
need to be ubiquitously available
throughout the community.

Communities of
enduser customers.

Potential unavailability
of essential service in
portions of community.

Applicable
"Essentiality
of Access"
Legal Principles

Policy Actions to Date

Non-discriminatory
access at reasonable
rates and with adequate standard of care
(i.e. "business affected
with a public interest",
common carrier, or
public utility regula-

Cable modem service
is an integrated information service with no
common carriage regulation. The same may
apply to wireline
broadband Internet
access providers.

tion).

Duty to serve (e.g.
build-out requirement;
exit barrier); perhaps
also some form of subsidization or government privilege (e.g.
franchise) to address
financial burden of
requirements.

For narrowband service,
telecommunications
carriers have build out
requirements and eligible carriers must
serve the entire service
area.
Cable companies have
build out requirements for cable service

in franchise area.
Access to the physical
layer, through interconnection at the logical layer, for ISP's,
who are competitors
at the logical layer.

Competitors.

Viewpoint diversity
principle and provider's refusal to provide access to its
essential facility with
competitors in a
related market,

Mandatory access to
address refusal to deal
(e.g. essential facilities
doctrine),

Cable modem service
providers not required
to provide access to
competitive ISP's.
Wireline Internet
access providers may
not have to unbundle
transmission component for sale under
tariff.

Access to physical, and
possibly logical, infrastructure of broadband service within
definition of universal
service.

Targeted enduser customers.

Inequality among individuals to access essential services due to
specific unaffordability
factors (e.g. indigence
or high cost of serving
customer).

Some form of subsidization for benefit of
needy customers; perhaps also coupled with
some form of duty to
serve,

Internet access is
within definition of
universal service for
eligible schools and
libraries and for rural
health care providers.
Greater discounts are
given for economically
disadvantaged and
rural schools and
libraries.

Viewpoint diversity
principle coupled with
potential refusals to
deal.

Refusals to deal with
speakers prohibited.

Interconnection
among telecommunications carriers; must
carry requirements on
cable companies; carry
one, carry all rule on
satellite television carriers.

Interconnection
Speakers as competiamong broadband net- tors (for benefit of
works,
audience).

line broadband Internet access providers (DSL
providers), the FCC has issued a Wireline Broadband Internet Access Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking ("NPRM").

94

tentatively concludes that wireline broadband Internet service to end users is also an integrated
information service with no offering of a separa-

In this NPRM, the FCC

94 In re the Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline
Broadband Internet Access NPRM].
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ble telecommunications service.9 5 If this tentative
conclusion is adopted, common carrier obligations would not apply to the physical layer of wireline broadband providers, even though wireline
providers would still be common carriers as their
narrowband physical network infrastructures.
By attempting to provide intermodal regulatory
parity in this manner, the FCC would create intramodal asymmetric regulationbetween the physical

layers of narrowband and broadband services.
This is because a wireline carrier provides both
narrowband and broadband services over the
same physical lines (at least for residential customers). The fundamental question is whether
such intramodal asymmetric regulation is sustainable. If not, then the entire common carrier regulatory regime for telecommunications services
could erode.
Access for Communities of Individual End
users

B.

The second broadband issue described in Table
2 is ensuring that all communities have access to
the physical infrastructure of the broadband networks. While the first issue is concerned with access to existing essential services or facilities, the
second assumes that such services or facilities may
not yet exist in some communities, or portions
thereof. For the latter issues, the underlying problem is that providers may refuse to invest in and
serve certain areas. Reasons for refusing to serve
may include business plans based on targeting
higher profit areas, or costs of providing service
that exceed the revenue that would reasonably be
expected to be generated. This is similar to the
issue and underlying problem that led to the use
of franchises and public utility regulation to impose an affirmative duty to serve, as discussed in
Section IV.B.1. Franchises (granting an exclusive
privilege to serve) customarily imposed requirements on the public utility to build out and serve
the entire franchise area-that is, imposed an affirmative duty to serve-as well as placed limitations on the utility's ability to discontinue provision of service. 96
Id. at 3029-24, paras. 17-26.
See supra note 20; CHFRRY, supra note 29, at 50-57.
97 See Unilateraland Bilateral Rules, supra note 12, at 39-58.
Carrier of last resort obligations were historically imposed by
the states on incumbent monopoly providers, for both local

For telecommunications carriers, similar requirements have been codified in state statutes,
and/or enforced through the imposition of carrier of last resort obligations9 7 with regard to the
provision of narrowbandservices. Similar build-out

requirements have been included in local governments' franchise agreements with cable companies as to the provision of cable service. However,
regulation of telecommunications carriers has
also included some form of subsidization scheme
either through the rate structure or through
funding mechanisms, to help carriers remain financially viable while providing essentially ubiquitous networks. 98 Such subsidization has been used
to implement universal service policy, which has
affected welfare rights, as discussed in Section
1V.C.
Section 157 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 directs the FCC and state commissions to
"encourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans." 99 Thus far, no provider
of broadband services has been required to build
out physical (or logical) infrastructure to serve
communities. As previously described, the existing affirmative duties to serve apply to narrowband and cable services, but not to broadband
services. To impose an affirmative obligation to
build out broadband facilities would be an expansion of, but not inconsistent with, the current regulatory regimes for telecommunications carriers
and cable companies.
C.

Access for Competitors

The third broadband issue described in Table 2
is ensuring that competitive Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have access to the physical infrastructure of a broadband provider through interconnection at the logical layer. The primary purpose
underlying a policy for such access is the government's interest in viewpoint diversity. More specifically, viewpoint diversity at the application and
content layers can be achieved through diversity
at the logical layer, because choice and quality of
both applications and content vary among ISPs.

95

exchange and toll services. Id. at 42. The continuing enforce-

96

ment of such obligations in a market open to competition is
an untested legal question.
98 See id. at 39-58.
99 47 U.S.C. §157.
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For refusal to deal with competitors, the applicable legal principle from Table 1 is to prohibit the
refusal to deal. In particular, if the provider's facilities are considered essential to viable competition in the related market, the essential facilities
doctrine would apply."()
As part of the Cable Modem Access Order discussed in Section V.A., the FCC has refused to
compel cable modem service providers-even if
they also provide local exchange service over the
same facilities-to provide access to its physical
network to competitive ISPs.(1I As previously dis-

cussed, in the Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, the FCC also tentatively concludes
that wireline broadband Internet access is an integrated information service and is not required to
provide the physical layer on a common carrier
basis to end users. 102 As for access by competitive

ISPs, the FCC seeks comments as to whether the
Bell Operating Companies should be relieved of
the Computer Inquiry requirements to unbundle
the transmission component for sale under
tariff.

0(-

If access to broadband should later be considered essential, retention of the Cable Modem Access Order could adversely impact individuals as
citizens by diminishing their access to diverse
sources of information and viewpoints. In addition, to the extent that individuals' access to ISPs
and use of the Internet is considered that of a
speaker, then individuals' free speech rights as
speakers would also be adversely affected. First
Amendment rights would be eroded further
should the FCC decide to relieve the Bell Operating Companies of the obligation to unbundle
their transmission component of broadband in
the Wireline Broadband Internet Access
NPRM. 104

MO One could argue that the purpose of the third broadband issue discussed here is one of antitrust tinder the Sherman Act. However, this concern is subsumed by the viewpoint diversity principle. Viewpoint diversity provides an additional, distinct government interest from the antitrust concern that may make the need for government intervention
more compelling. In this regard, the reader should note that
the first broadband issue in Table 2 could also list viewpoint
diversity as an added purpose. However, for purposes of discussion, it is preferable to address the impact solely on the
economic rights as a starting point.
101
See Cable Modem Access Order, supra note 90, at paras. 33 and 38.
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Broadband as Universal Service

The fourth broadband issue described in Table
2 is expanding the definition of universal service
under Section 254 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 to include access to broadband service. Again, for purposes of discussion here, this
issue assumes that broadband is considered an essential service. The problem is that there is inequality among individuals' access to broadband
service due to affordability factors. For example,
some residents may be low income or others may
not be able to afford prices in high cost areas.
This is the same problem that has been addressed
by legal principles affecting welfare rights discussed in Section IV.C. From Table 1, the legal
principles suggested are: providing some funding
directly to the disadvantaged individuals to obtain
the service or subsidizing the essential service on
behalf of the disadvantaged individuals.
At this time, FCC rules include Internet access
within the definition of universal service for eligible schools and libraries, as well as for rural health
care providers without toll-free access to the Internet.115 As a result, these eligible entities receive
Internet access at a discount, and, in turn, the eligible carrier providing the access receives federal
universal service support to compensate for the
relevant discount. The discounts for eligible
schools and libraries are significantly greater for
those that are economically disadvantaged or in
rural areas. 11 6 Furthermore, in Section 214(e) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, eligible carriers are required to provide universal service
throughout the service area. 1 7 In other words,
there is also a duty to serve in order to ensure
availability of Internet access service.
Therefore, for eligible schools, libraries and rural health care providers, the current universal
service mechanism is consistent with the existing
legal principles that have been applied to provide
1)2
See Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, supra
note 94, at para. 20.
':
See id. at paras. 43-53.
114
Arguably, users of the Internet could be speakers and
audience simultaneously, as with telecommunications service. See infra Section IV.D. The same could be true of ISPs.
But, in order to contrast situations where the competitor denied access is a non-speaker with those where the competitor
denied access is a speaker, the third broadband issue here
assumes that the ISPs are not speakers. See infra Section V.E.
105
47 C.F.R. §§54.503 and 54.621 (2001).
l06 47 C.F.R. §54.505 (2001).
107

47 U.S.C. §214(e) (2001).
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disadvantaged individuals with access to essential
services. The eligible entities receive discounted
rates, with higher discounts for disadvantaged entities. However, the size of the existing funding
obligations of the federal universal service support mechanisms, which for eligible schools and
libraries and rural health care providers is over
two billion dollars per year, is of major con-

cern.10

8

Federal universal service support for disadvantaged individuals (low income households, high
cost areas) does exist, but only for access to the
narrowband physical infrastructure. If the definition of universal service is modified to include
broadband, existing federal universal service support mechanisms could also be used to support
access to broadband. However, expanding the
definition of universal service to include broadband for disadvantaged individuals would only
magnify the already large funding burden imposed on the telecommunications industry. To
preserve the federal universal support mechanisms for current recipients, much less enable expansion of support for broadband access to individuals directly, the means of raising the funding
for these mechanisms may need to change. Alternatives include federal legislation that would enable the FCC to also access contributions based
on the intrastate revenues of telecommunications
carriers, or funding from the federal government's general tax revenues.1 0 '
E.

Access by Speaker as End User or
Competitor

The interconnection among broadband networks in order to ensure that the Internet continues to function as a network of networks is the fi108 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking and Report and Order, 67
Fed. Reg. 11268 (2002) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 54
(2002)) (considering modifications to the system under
which contributions are made by telecommunications carriers-based on assessments against interstate revenues-to
fund the federal universal service support mechanisms in
light of the existing funding burden). Concerns as to the viability of the existing funding burden are driven, in large part,
by declining interstate long distance revenues and the FCC's
lack of authority to assess contributions based on carriers' intrastate revenues. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC,
183 F.3d 393, 448 (5th Cir. 1999).
109 See supra note 94; Unilateral and Bilateral Rules, supra
note 12, at 39-58.
110 Some might argue that ISPs may also be speakers. If

nal issue addressed in Table 2. This issue is important in that it provides viewpoint diversity (access
to a diversity of applications and content). Potential interconnection problems are primarily at the
physical and logical layers due to refusals to deal
among the network providers. Such refusals to
deal among competitors pose obstacles similar to
those discussed for competitive ISPs.
Both the third and fifth broadband issues are
similar, but they differ in an important respect.
The third broadband issue addresses access by
ISPs in their economic relationship as a competitor of the provider, but also as a non-speaker under
the First Amendment. 11 0 However, the fifth
broadband issue addresses access by competitors
who may also be speakers under the First Amendment. Therefore, under the fifth broadband issue,
the free speech rights of competitors may also be
adversely affected.
As discussed in Section IV, where not inconsistent with the constitutional rights of the provider,
the government may require providers of electronic mass media to open access to speakers.
This is true even if the speaker is a mass media
competitor using a different technology platform.
Some requirements have already been imposed
on cable companies and satellite television carriers to carry local broadcasting stations in support
of viewpoint diversity. These are one-way interconnection requirements from local broadcasting stations to cable and satellite systems. Although
these requirements do not apply with regard to
the provision of broadband, they do provide a
precedent for imposing interconnection requirements among competing technology platforms
that also have speaker status. II Evaluation of the
government's interest in imposing access to competitors as speakers will, of course, have to be balso, then the problems raised under the third and fifth broad-

band issues are similar. However, for purposes of analysis
here, it is instructive to contrast situations where competitors

are non-speakers with those where competitors are speakers.
See supra note 104.
111 Telecommunications carriers are also required to interconnect with each other, whether or not they provide
competing services. However, telecommunications carriers
have a First Amendment status as non-speakers with respect
to the provision of telecommunications services. See supra
Section IV.D. However, if common carrier regulation erodes-for example, as with the first and third broadband issues-the status of telecommunications carriers as nonspeakers may need to change to prevent intermodal regula-

tory asymmetry.
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anced against the free speech rights of the access
provider.
F.

Summary of Effects on Broadband Access
Issues

As the discussion throughout Section V shows,
current regulation and likely outcomes of pending proceedings could pose obstacles for achieving the five types of access issues described in Table 2 should broadband be considered an essential service of facility. These obstacles could create
adverse effects for the intended access recipients.
Table 3 provides an overview of these obstacles
based on the analyses of the five broadband access
issues conducted in this section. In the first column, each broadband access issue is described as
it appears in Table 2. For each broadband access
issue, the table then describes: the nature of the
current, or pending consideration of, relevant
regulation; the likely effect of that regulation, if
unchanged, on achieving the type of access at issue; and the likely adverse effects on the intended
access recipients in terms of the type of rights affected.
At this juncture, it may be helpful to review the
results described in the last two columns. For the
first broadband issue, the economic rights of individuals as end users of both narrowbandand broadband physical infrastructures may be adversely affected due to intramodal asymmetric regulation
of narrowband and broadband infrastructures of
wireline (non-cable) providers. For the second issue, the economic rights of communities of individual end users of broadband infrastructure may
be similarly diminished.
As for the fourth broadband issue, to the extent
that the financial burden of federal universal service support becomes unsustainable, the welfare
rights of intended recipients would be adversely
affected. Therefore, if the burden is unsustainable
under the current definition of universal service,
it certainly would not be sustainable upon a
broadening of the definition to include broadband service on a wider scale. Furthermore, to the
extent that common carrier and public utility regulation for the benefit of the general public (not
just disadvantaged individuals or communities) is

viewed as an early form of welfare state regula112

See generally Cherry Telecomm Address, supra note 71.
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tion,' 12 welfare rights of individuals and communities under the first two broadband access issues
would also be adversely affected.
For both the third and fifth issues, the free
speech rights of individuals as citizens of a democracy could be adversely impacted. This is because,
as to both issues, government's failure to require
interconnection with competitive ISPs or among
broadband networks could undermine its interest
in facilitating viewpoint diversity for American citizens. Furthermore, failure to require interconnection could also adversely affect the speech
rights of individuals and competitive ISPs in their
status as speakers. In this way, as will be discussed
in Section VI.D., the free speech rights of broadband network providers as corporations could be
permitted to trump those of natural persons as
citizens.

VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS VERSUS CORPORATIONS

If access to broadband is deeied essential,
changes in regulation would be required to prevent the adverse effects on intended access recipients summarized in Table 3. If the historical legal
principles mandating access to essential services
or facilities discussed in Section IV are invoked,
possible remedies for each of the five broadband
access issues, include: (1) imposing common carrier obligations on all broadband providers of the
physical layer; (2) imposing some duty to serve
(build-out) obligations on broadband providers,
which could vary among communities with the
possible inclusion of some financial relief to mitigate the financial burden; (3) compelling broadband providers to provide access to competitive
ISPs; (4) changing the method of recovering contributions for the federal universal service support
mechanisms, such as including assessment against
telecommunications carriers' intrastate revenues,
or having funding come from general tax revenues; and (5) requiring interconnection among
broadband networks at whatever layer is necessary.
However, for any suggested remedy that imposes additional burdens on broadband access
providers,
constitutional
challenges
will
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Table 3: Obstacles to Achieving "Essentiality of Access"
For Broadband Access Issues
Current or Pending Regulation

Adverse Effect of Current
Regulation

Adversely Affected Rights of
Access Recipients

1. Enduser access to physical
infrastructure of broadband
network.

Government may impose
intramodal asymmetric regulation of telecommunications
carriers' narrowband and
broadband physical layers.

Erosion of common carrier
regulation for narrowband
physical layer, and potential
unavailability of access to
broadband physical layer.

Economic (and welfare)*
rights of individuals as
endusers of narrowband and
broadband access.

2. Physical and/or logical
infrastructures of broadband
network need to be ubiquitously available throughout
the community.

Government imposes no
affirmative duty to serve
communities, or portions
thereof, with broadband
physical layer.

Some communities, or portions thereof, may not have
access to broadband physical
infrastructure,

Economic (and welfare)*
rights of communities of
individuals as endusers of
broadband access.

3. Access to the physical
layer, through interconnection at the logical layer, for
ISP's who are competitors at
the logical layer.

Government imposes no
obligation on cable modem
access providers to provide
access to competitive ISP's.
BOC's may not have to
unbundle transmission cornponent of broadband service.

Goal of viewpoint diversity
could be undermined.

Free speech rights of individuals as citizens of democracy
(reflected in government
interest in viewpoint diversity) and possibly also as
speakers.

4. Access to physical, and
possibly logical, infrastructure of broadband service
within definition of universal
service.

Existing funding burden of
federal universal service support for Internet access to
eligible schools and libraries
and rural health care providers is large. Funding burden
would increase if support is
expanded for broadband services to individuals.

Unsustainability of federal
universal service support
mechanisms, and therefore
unavailability of reasonably
priced broadband service.

Welfare rights of intended
beneficiaries.

5. Interconnection among
broadband networks,

Government may not impose
necessary interconnection
requirements among broadband networks,

Goal of viewpoint diversity
could be undermined.

Free speech rights of:
(a) individuals as citizens of
democracy (reflected in government interest in viewpoint diversity) and possibly
also as speakers; and
(b) competitors as speakers.

Broadband Issue

* Welfare rights would also be applicable if one considers common carrier and public utility regulation to be an early form of welfare

state regulation. See note 72, supra.

emerge.'3 To address the effects on their economic interests, the most likely challenges will be
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. 14
Constitutional challenges by broadband access
providers will require the courts to weigh the
competing interests of broadband providers and
In fact, constitutional challenges are more likely to
113
arise when government responds to change in communications technology by transitions from monopoly-based to deregulatory policies. See Cherry & Wildman 2000, supra note 12,
at 66-93.
114 Challenges may also be brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, §1. Such claims would be based on allegations of uncon-

access recipients. This will pose difficulties for the
courts in conducting the necessary constitutional
analyses. Some difficulties will arise from the need
to address conflicts in the differing legal regimes
among now-competing technology platforms.
However, this section discusses difficulties that appear to have been previously unraised in broadband policy debates. More specifically, the constistitutional disparate treatment of a regulation among broadband providers. However, the Equal Protection Clause is not
discussed here for two reasons. First, the distinction in constitutional rights of natural persons and corporations will

most likely arise in disputes between access recipients and access providers, not in disputes among broadband access providers. Second, the same jurisprudence applies for determining corporations' constitutional rights as "persons" under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See infra note 120, and accompanying text.
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tutionality of broadband regulation may depend
upon the characteristics of the corporate form of
broadband providers.
A.

No Consistent Theory of Constitutional
Rights for Corporations

It is well established that corporations do have
constitutional rights but they are not coextensive
with those of individuals as natural persons.' '5 In
some instances, corporations have no constitutional rights whatsoever. For example, a corporation is not a "citizen" protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2116
or of the Fourteenth Amendment' 1 7 of the
United States Constitution, nor is it a "person"
with a right against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment." Yet, use of the phrase "citizen" or "person" in the United States Constitution
is not definitive in determining a corporation's
See Note, ConstitutionalRights of the CorporatePerson,91
L.J. 1641, 1644 (1982) (discussing the constitutional
rights of corporations as compared to natural persons)
[hereinafter ConstitutionalRights of the CorporatePerson]; Peter
J. Henning, The Conundrum of CorporateCriminalLiability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the ConstitutionalRights of Corporations in CriminalProsecutions,63 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996) (discussing the constitutional rights of corporations as compared
to natural persons) [hereinafter Henning]; Larry E. Ribstein,
The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation,4 SUPREME CT.
ECON. REV. 95 (1995) (discussing the constitutional rights of
corporations as compared to natural persons) [hereinafter
Ribstein].
11I
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (holding that
"Citizens" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 applies only to natural persons; corporations are citizens only for the purpose of determining court
jurisdiction).
117
W. Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907)
(holding that "Citizens" under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include corporations).
118 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is personal to the witness and cannot be invoked by a corporation
where the witness is an officer or employee).
I119 Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809) (holding that a corporation is not a citizen and cannot sue or be
sued in courts of the United States unless the rights of the
individual members can be exercised in their corporate
name).
County of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S.
121)
394 (1886), is cited as the case that established this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment even though no such
holding is contained in the Court's opinion. Dissenting opinions in subsequent cases have illuminated the flaw of this attribution. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 85-87 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the
Slaughter House cases decided in 1873, in which the Court
115
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rights. For example, individual citizens can sue or
be sued in their corporate name for purposes of
invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, lI., and a corporation has been considered
a "person" protected by the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12"
However, the "[United States Supreme] Court
has never adopted a single test for applying constitutional rights to corporations, at least in part
because it has never agreed upon a single understanding of what a corporation is for constitutional purposes."12' In early cases, the Court
viewed the corporation as an artificial legal entity
22
with a distinct bundle of rights and obligations.
Under this theory, "government's power to create
corporations also implies and assumes pervasive
government power to regulate corporations. This,
in turn, provides a basis for denigrating the constitutional protection of corporate activities." 23 In
found that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed following
freedom of a race from slavery and applied only to natural
persons, and concluding that "the language of the amendment itself does not support the theory that it was passed for
the benefit of corporations"); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-81 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting;
Black, J., concurring in the dissent) (asserting that a corporation as a "person" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not a holding
in the opinion in Santa Clara,but merely an assertion by then
Chief justice Waite from the bench during oral argument).
Nonetheless, the Santa Clara case is still cited, although improperly so, as having settled the issue that corporations are
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
780 n.15 (1978); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression
and the CorporationAfter First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO.
L.J. 1347, 1353-55 (1979) (stating that the Santa Clara decision is noted for holding that all constitutional guarantees
for individuals are applicable to corporations as well).
121
Henning, supra note 115, at 807.
122
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518, 636 (1819) (providing the most famous expression of
the corporation as an artificial legal entity, which is often referred to as the corporate person theory).
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object
for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of
many persons are considered as the same, and may act as
a single individual. Id.
123 Ribstein, supra note 115, at 96.
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the view of incorporation as a privilege granted by
the sovereign came into disfavor due to concerns
of monopoly and corruption. 21 4 "As access to corporate status became a right of the many
[through State general incorporation statutes],
the corporation came to be regarded progressively less as a creation of the sovereign and increasingly more as a product of contractual agreement." 125 Under this view, the corporation is simply a device for referring to the summary of rights
and duties of the private parties who contractually
agreed to create it, and therefore should be afforded the same constitutional protections as natural persons. 126
The determination of corporate constitutional
rights does depend on the theory of the corporation that is used. Yet, the Court has never provided an overall unifying theory of the corporation to explain its holdings.127 Nonetheless, some
preliminary conclusions can be made regarding
likely constitutional challenges that will be
brought by broadband access providers. First,
treatment of claims related to takings of private
property for public use withoutjust compensation
will be independent of the corporate form. Second, policy makers' views of necessary regulation
may depend on the unique attributes of the corporate form, and the constitutionality of such regulation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will depend upon the characteristics of the affected business. Third, addressing competing free speech rights between corporate broadband providers and natural persons will
likely be the most contested area. There is precedent for restricting free speech rights of corporations to a greater extent than for natural persons. 28 However, the extent to which greater restrictions can be placed on media-related corpora124
ConstitutionalRights of the CorporatePerson, supra note
115, at 1647. This assertion refers to some of the problems
that resulted in the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Sherman Act, as discussed supra Sections IV.B.2 and
B.3.
125
ConstitutionalRights of the CorporatePerson, supra note
115, at 1647.
126
Id. at 1647-48. See also Ribstein, supra note 115, at 96.
127
See supra note 115. In each of these articles, the author offers his own theory or model for viewing the corporation in the twentieth century.
128
See Ribstein, supra note 115, at 124-38 (discussing the
justifications for restricting speech more so for corporations
than for natural persons).
129
The Takings Clause provides in relevant part: "nor

tions is unclear. Addressing conflicts in free
speech interests among broadband providers and
natural persons (as the intended access recipients
of broadband policies) will likely be the most
compelling and complex challenge for policy
makers and the courts.
B.

Takings of Private Property: Constitutional
Rights Independent of Corporate Form

One of the most fundamental limits on actions
by the federal and state governments is that government may not take private property for public
use without providing just compensation. This
prohibition applies to the federal government
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 129 and to
the state governments under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 0 This
prohibition protects the owners of private property, regardless of the form by which the owners
may be organized. Valid takings claims arise not
only when government exercises its eminent domain power to take real property, but also when
exercise of its regulatory powers is considered
confiscatory. Classic examples of the latter are
public utility cases in which the financial viability
of the utility is threatened by requirements of
31
state and/or federal regulatory requirements.'
More recent examples are cases regarding physical collocation requirements imposed on incum32
bent local exchange companies.
The imposition of historical legal principles for
mandating access to essential services or facilities
discussed in Section IV to the second (access for
communities of individual end users), third (access for competitors) and fifth (access by speaker
as end user or competitor) broadband issues discussed in Section V could generate takings claims
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See also Cherry &
Wildman 2000, supra note 12, at 69-74 (discussing the applicability of the Takings Clause to communications policies).
130 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417
(1896); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
238-39, 241 (1897). See also infra note 135 and accompanying
text (discussing the Due Process Clause).
' '
See Cherry & Wildman 2000, supra note 12, at 72-74.
132
See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1447 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (finding the FCC order of physical collocation to
be a physical taking of property under the Fifth Amendment); GTE N.W. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 900
P.2d 495, 506 (Or. 1995) (holding that the state commission's order of physical collocation constituted a taking).
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under certain circumstances. For example, imposition of an affirmative duty to serve could be confiscatory if the cost of providing broadband physical infrastructure far exceeds the price that customers could reasonably pay.'- 3 A requirement to
provide access to facilities to competitors or to interconnect with other broadband providers could
be confiscatory if reasonable compensation is not
required to be paid to cover relevant costs. Failure
to provide for compensation was a main defect of
the physical collocation cases.' 3a4 Consideration of
confiscation claims under such circumstances
would not be a function of whether or not the affected broadband provider was a corporation.
C.

Due Process Affecting Private Property
Rights: Policy Rationale Affected by
Corporate Form

Aside from takings claims, a corporation's property interests are further protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides that no State shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due

as "businesses affected with a public interest." It is
under this body of law that obligations imposed
on common carriers and public utilities have
been upheld. For such businesses, regulation to
protect the public interest is justified to address
various forms of economic coercion.
As for the legal principles affecting economic
interests in Section IV, it appears that the corporate form of the broadband providers may be relevant to policy makers' decisions of what obligations to impose. The greater the abuses associated
with the corporate form, the greater the justification for economic regulation. Furthermore, so
long as broadband providers bear characteristics
similar to those of "businesses affected with a public interest," 13 6 application of these legal principles for the benefit of end users should not pose
any problems under the Due Process Clause. The
legal obligations to deal with competitors could
also be deemed consistent with interpretation of
the Sherman Act.
D.

Free Speech Rights: Constitutional Rights
Affected by Corporate Form

process of law."' 1 35 Economic regulation under a

State's police power must be consistent with due
process.
As discussed in Sections IV.B.2 and B.3, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Act to expressly address economic
abuses that it attributed to the development of the
modern corporation. Historically, the corporate
form has been relevant to legislators' views of appropriate economic regulation.
Furthermore, the scope of permissible economic regulation for a given business depends on
the specific circumstances in each case. There is a
well-established line of cases that upholds a
greater degree of regulation for businesses bearing certain characteristics, commonly referred to
133

Takings claims in this context would be similar to

those that have been raised at times by public utilities. See

Cherry & Wildman 2000, supra note 12.
134 See id. at 132 and Cherry & Wildman 2000,

supra note

12, at 102.
1'5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. However, the applicability of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the property interests of corporations is not withotIt controversy. See THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND
(2002). In any event, protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause applies only to
natural, not artificial, persons. W Turf Ass'n v Greenburg, 204
THE THEFT OF HUMAN RiR;iIS

As discussed in Section IV.D, the courts recognize the dual role of the First Amendment in protecting the interests of individuals and helping to
sustain a democracy. 137 Recognizing this dual

role, in some cases, the courts have upheld governmentally-imposed access requirements on
electronic mass media in furtherance of viewpoint
diversity even though it would limit the medium
owner's First Amendment rights.' 3 8
The jurisprudence in this area is very complex
for various reasons.1 39 First, the level of judicial
scrutiny applied to regulation affecting the
speech rights of the mass media differs among
technology platforms. 14 In other words, a given
regulation may be constitutional for one technolU.S. 359, 363 (1907).
1-36For the purposes of discussion in Section V, it is as-

sumed that broadband providers did bear similar characteristics to "businesses affected with a public interest."
37
See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
13$8 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
139 See generally BOTEIN, supra note 81 (discussing free
speech jurisprudence as applied to electronic mass media);

THOM

BARTON CARTER, MARC A. FRANKLIN,

J.

WRIGHT, THE

FIRST AMENDMENT AND THiE FOURTH ESTATE (8th ed. 2001)
(discussing free speech jurisprudence as applied to electronic mass media).
1411
See supra note 87.
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ogy platform, but not for another. Secondly, the
jurisprudence for any given technology platform
is uncertain. For example, the traditional justification for a lower level ofjudicial scrutiny for broadcasting-spectrum scarcity-no longer seems appropriate.'

41

In addition, the United States Su-

preme Court has refused to unambiguously state
the First Amendment status of cable companies, 14 2 only able to reach its decision in Turner II
(must carry requirements) by plurality. 143 Third,
convergence among technology platforms only
serves to heighten the complexity of applying First
Amendment analysis to the media. The convergence between telecommunications carriers as
non-speakers with the electronic mass media as
speakers is an example, as discussed in Section
IV.D.
Today, the need to address the First Amendment status of competing communications technology platforms is receiving much attention.
Many recent articles have focused on the free
speech rights among information infrastructure
providers.'

44

The discussion as to the third (access for competitors) and fifth (access by speaker as end user
or competitor) broadband issues in Section V also
illustrates the great potential for regulation to
cause conflicting free speech interests between access recipients and broadband providers. To date,
analyses regarding conflicting free speech rights
of access recipients and broadband providers
have primarily focused on open access requirements as applied to cable broadband service prov141
See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licens
ing Broadcasters,64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990 (1989). Furthermore,
changing views of spectrum scarcity is shifting the regulatory
regime for spectrum allocation from administrative hearings
to auctions. See FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER, A PROPOSAL FOR A
RAPID TRANSITION TO MARKET ALLOCATION OF SPECTRUM,

(au-

thored by Evan Kwerel and John Williams), 38 FCC Rcd. 1624 (2002).
142
See supra note 87.
143
See supra note 83.
144
See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National
Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 51 (1995);
Andrew D. Auerbach, MandatoryAccess and the Information Infrastructure,3 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1 (1994); Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062 (1994).
145 See, e.g., David Wolitz, Open Access and the First Amendment: A Critique of Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v.
Broward County, 4 YALE SYMP. L. & TECHN. 6 (2001) (arguing

that open access regulation of cable operators to allow all
ISPs to lease bandwidth on cable lines at nondiscriminatory
rates is consistent with the Free Speech Clause of the First

iders. 145
However, no attention has been given to the
relevance of the corporate form as a factor in addressing the constitutionality of government restrictions on free speech rights. Yet, the need to
resolve conflicts among free speech interests of intended access recipients and access providers will
often require evaluation of their constitutional
rights as natural persons and corporations, respectively.
There is precedent for restricting the free
speech rights of corporations to a greater extent
than natural persons for reasons directly related
46
to unique characteristics of the corporate form. 1
Political speech, unlike commercial speech, receives the highest level of First Amendment protection. 14 7 Nevertheless, in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,14s the United States Su-

preme Court upheld a Michigan statute that prohibited certain corporations from using corporate
treasury funds for independent expenditures in
support or opposition of candidates in state elections. 149 The Court found that this restriction on
corporations' political speech was justified because the State had a compelling interest in
preventing a specific type of corruption in the political arena: "the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public's
50
support for the corporation's political ideas."'1
The Court held that the Michigan legislature had
identified a serious danger that "corporate politiAmendment under an intermediate scrutiny test); Harold
Feld, Whose Line is it Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable
Open Access, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23 (2000) (arguing that

Internet access through cable providers should be treated as

a common carrier service from a First Amendment point of
view).
See supra note 115.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (creating the
commercial speech doctrine). See Ribstein, supra note 115, at
124-29 (discussing the differing levels of First Amendment
protection for political and commercial speech).
148 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
149
Id. at 668-69.
150 Id. at 660. The statute applied only to independent
expenditures from corporate treasuries for which the means
of amassing the funds had little correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas. Corporations
could make expenditures through separate segregated funds
where contributions are made by people based on the understanding that the funds would be used solely for political purposes. Id. at 659-60.
146

147
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cal expenditures will undermine the integrity of
the political process."'

5

1

Therefore, because the

government had a compelling interest in preventing the erosion of the political process, the court
ruled that the prohibition was warranted. As the
court stated, "the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures." 152
In Austin the statute did exempt media corporations from the expenditure restriction.15" The

Court upheld this exemption under the Equal
Protection Clause because "[a] valid distinction
.. . exists between corporations that are part of
the media industry and other corporations that
are not involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public."'15 4 However, the
Court further stated: "[A] lthough the press' unique
societal role may not entitle the press to greaterprotection
under the Constitution, it does provide a compelling

reason for the State to exempt media corporations from the scope of political expenditure limitations."' 5 By this statement, the Court implied
that placing the same restrictions on the pressthe form of mass media with the highest level of
First Amendment protection-may be constitutional. Although clearly not definitive, the Court's
opinion reflects that the Court may be open to
placing limitations on the free speech rights of
mass media providers for reasons related to characteristics unique to the corporate form.
Thus, Austin does support the possibility of allowing the government to place restrictions on
broadband access providers' free speech rights for
reasons related to characteristics unique to corporations. A compelling governmental interest
could be viewpoint diversity, as discussed with regard to the third (access by competitors) and fifth
(access by speaker as end user or competitor)
broadband access issues in Section V. This would
present conflicts between the free speech rights of
access recipients and broadband providers. In balancing the interests of the access recipients and
access providers, a justification for imposing restrictions on the providers' free speech rights
could be the various forms of economic coercion
discussed under the first three (access by individ151

Id. at 668.

152

Id. at 660.

153

Id. at 667-87.
Id. at 668.

154
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ual end users, communities of individual end
users or competitors) broadband issues discussed
in Section V. The economic abuses of media corporations could be considered particularly acute
given their corporate form, much as Congress
found for railroads and large industrial enterprises when it enacted the Interstate Commerce
15
Act and the Sherman Act.'

CONCLUSION
In various contexts the government has intervened to ensure that essential services and facilities are provided to the public. The legal principles employed have varied with the type of access
problem-what services or facilities are deemed
to be essential, for whom they are deemed essential, the nature of the relationship between the intended access recipient and the access provider,
and the circumstances impeding the accessibility
of the service or facilities. The mapping of access
situations bearing similar characteristics to the
historical legal principles applied to them is referred to here as an "essentiality of access" typology. "Essentiality of access" is a valuable organizing principle for evaluating future public policy
objectives affecting the technologically converging communications industries, because policy
problems that have been previously handled by
distinct legal rules for any given technology must
now be addressed simultaneously across competing technology platforms.
Applying "essentiality of access" typology to current broadband access issues demonstrates how
pursuit of broadband policy objectives requires
recognizing the various relationships between access recipients and the access providers that affect
different categories of legal rights: economic, welfare and free speech rights. Different categories of
rights implicate different legal principles, which,
at times, may conflict. This requires policy makers
to choose some interests over others. Furthermore, pursuit of multiple broadband access objectives makes the selection of appropriate government interventions a tremendously complex endeavor.
"Essentiality of access" analysis shows that if
155

Id. at 668 (emphasis added) (internal citations omit-

ted).
156

See supra Sections IV.B.2 and B.3.
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broadband should later be considered an essential service or facility, current or pending policy
actions affecting broadband could create adverse
effects for the economic, welfare and free speech
rights of intended access recipients. For example,
lack of a common carriage requirement on cable
modem access and wireline broadband Internet
access providers could adversely affect the availability of broadband and narrowband services at
reasonable rates. Lack of an affirmative duty to
serve communities with broadband infrastructure
could leave some areas without any broadband access. In addition, lack of a requirement on broadband providers to share their physical infrastructure with competitive ISPs, or the lack of interconnection requirements among broadband physical
or logical infrastructures, could diminish viewpoint diversity-a longstanding government interest.

"Essentiality of access" analysis also shows that
there is an even more fundamental challenge for
policymakers and the courts. The constitutionality
of broadband policies-such as under the Due
Process Clause or free speech under the First
Amendment-may depend on characteristics of
broadband providers that are unique to the corporate form. It has long been established that the
legal rights and duties of individuals and corporations are not synonymous under United States
law, and that the government has created legal
principles to specifically address abuses of power
by corporations. The courts will need to clarify
the principles for determining the constitutional
rights of corporations under the United States
Constitution in order to address the constitutional challenges that new broadband policies will
likely engender.

